The mainstream or neoclassical economics view that labor is rewarded according to its productivity has been extended to managers and management teams as justification for the levels of compensation that they receive. Additionally, the management concept of "span of management" has been used to explain the total number of and per employee number of managers in any organization along with the economics assumption that the appropriate span of management is where the marginal productivity of the last manager employed equals his/her marginal cost, or wage. On the other hand, Marxists and institutionalists hold different views of the roles and purposes of managers within organizations and attempt to explain these through either the view of managers exploiting workers on behalf of owners or the view of managers exploiting both workers and owners in order to advance their own agenda. This research note examines managerial compensation and intensity from both traditional/mainstream and alternative views by focusing on measures of managerial salaries, employee productivity, return on owners' equity, return on assets, and rates of workers exploitation.
Introduction
In most standard microeconomics courses, students are often taught the basics of marginal productivity theory which states that factors of production are compensated according to their levels of productivity, or in other words, to their level of contribution to an organization's profits. Profit maximization is stated as an organizational goal (see the textbook by Mankiw (2013) among many others). Some mainstream economists and most heterodox economists note that productivity is difficult to measure and almost impossible to link to compensation.
1 In general, Marxists and neo-Marxists see managers as means for the capitalist class to exploit workers in a way to extract as much surplus value from them as possible (Baran and Sweezy 1966 , Braverman 1974 , Marglin 1974a , Marglin 1974b , Gordon 1996 . Baran and Sweezy (1966, pp. 46-48) view managers as basically part of the capitalist class, and because their personal savings and financial interests align with firm owners, they pursue maximum labor exploitation and at the same time mostly serve the interests of owners, which are also congruent with their interests. Braverman (1974) and Marglin (1974a) question whether specialization, assembly lines, and managers actually raise productivity in modern times versus when a lot of work was done by smaller shops and craftsmen. To them, mass production, specialization and the rise of a managerial class originate more under capitalism's need for exploitation and control of labor rather than productivity concerns. Braverman particularly points out that the main goal of scientific management is actually to cheapen labor by employing low skilled to produce items, and the low skill labor in turn presumably needs guidance from managers. Gordon (1996) even goes so far as to argue that increasing managerial numbers, even during a time of corporate "downsizing" (Caves and Kreps 1993) , is a symptom of the fact that capitalist owners basically do not trust employees, and so owners employ more and more managers in order to minimize employee shirking and to monitor employee performance. This is despite the possibility that more managers may entail what he calls a "bureaucratic burden" for organizations, or in other words, higher salary costs and a greater monitoring of employees to the extent that there is a fall in firm productivity. Gordon's 1996 book builds upon some of earlier works on these topics that he did by himself (1990, 1994) and along with co-authors (Weisskopf, Bowles, and Gordon 1983) which involved some statistical analysis wherein he predicted what he called the intensity of supervision 2 using the independent variables or constructs of the threat/cost of job loss, worker independence (degree of unionization, legal job protection, job stability, etc.), degree of government support for workers' rights and social welfare, etc. These types of variables were successful predictors of the level of supervisory intensity whereas a major mainstream, neoclassical concept such as efficiency wages was not. The mainstream neoclassical theory of efficiency wages as used by him as meaning higher wages in a workforce should mean less economy wide supervisory personnel because, on average and ceteris paribus, workers tend to have higher productivity, tend to be more self-motivated, and more likely to stay at a job, and therefore do not need so much supervision. Yet efficiency wages were not found to be statistically significant in any of his econometric models.
In his book, which is probably one of the most recent and thorough explorations of capitalist management from a neo-Marxist point of view, Gordon mostly relies upon charts, graphs, tables and simple descriptive statistics to make the case that in some nations, especially the US, the level of managers has grown (despite what other reports contend) while wage inequality and job instability have risen at the same time. He argues that in some economies a "wage squeeze" is in play wherein high unemployment rates, decreasing unionization rates, smaller unemployment and social welfare benefits, and stagnant minimum wage rates have led to overall stagnant wages for most workers. To offset the effect of declining wages, and hence, declining worker desire to be productive, Gordon argues that managerial levels have increased simultaneously so that firms can apply what he calls "the stick", or closer monitoring and watching of employees in order to motivate workers to perform at an acceptable level. This in turn, however, can actually lead to lower productivity rates and lead to greater managementlabor strife, and so he notes an upturn in the number of strikes and "lock-outs" that have occurred in those economies which have seen stagnating wages and increasing managerial ranks.
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In the course of doing research for this paper, only a few papers have been found which do additional empirical analyses of how the intensity of supervision or the bureaucratic burden can be linked to growing wage and income inequality in either the US or different developed nations. A paper by Leicht and Brady (2011) uses the number of jobs classified as managerial as a portion of a nation's labor force as a successful predictor of various measures of earnings inequality in different multivariate econometric models. Their findings also somewhat reinforce the contention of Braverman (1974) and Marglin (1974a) that specialization and layers of managers used in coordinating labor are really unnecessary since productivity is not enhanced by either. 4 Both Gordon (1996) and Marglin (1974a) argue that managers try to keep as much of the surplus for themselves even though they are supposed to serve the interests of shareholders, and so this has been part of the reason for the rise of a managerial class, something about which institutional economists have written (Veblen 1904 , 1923 , Galbraith 1973 . This view, therefore, generally disagrees with the one of Baran and Sweezy (1966) . Marglin (1974b) also writes in another paper that contrary to neoclassical theory most national savings is done through business and managerial hierarchies rather than through households. Nonetheless, whether surplus extraction exists to enrich management, shareholders or both, all of these authors would probably agree that greater intensity of supervision seeks to maximize the extraction of surplus value whether for the bosses or shareholders or both groups.
A paper by Buchele and Christiansen (1999) supports through econometric analysis the Gordon contention that more harmonious working conditions, greater workers' rights, and lesser intensity of supervision result in greater growth of labor productivity. Meanwhile, there are volumes of mainstream, non-radical, scholarly management pieces which point to greater worker productivity or productivity enhancement in organizations due to participatory management, human relations techniques, and Theory Y principles. Some of these studies involve empirical work. These papers and books are far too numerous to list, but a good compilation and overview of these principles and theories are usually contained in any introduction to management book (e.g., Griffin's Management, 11 th edition (2013)).
Although not mentioning Gordon or his works, Mohun (2014) takes a radical economics approach and argues that the biggest driver of "unproductive" labor and wage growth in the US economy over the last five decades has been the growth of supervisory positions and their wages. Dumenil and Levy (2011) argue that the increase in financial management positions is a symptom of neo-liberal policies implemented over the last 35 years or so, and Jo and Henry (2015) also note this and assert that the presence of so many financial "money" managers are contrary to adequate social provisioning. Perelman (2011) writes that capitalism stunts the development of workers, and one way this is done through the use of heavy handed management practices.
Otherwise, no papers involving econometric work on how the bureaucratic burden or bloat (hereafter BB) or how too many managers may affect productivity or efficiency, managerial compensation, and surplus extraction at the industry level have been found in doing a literature review for this paper. This absence is, in the opinion of this paper, a gap in the literature since one of Gordon's main arguments, and especially since he uses terms such as burden and bloat, is that excessive managerial numbers can cause a drain on efficiency and output. Additionally, showing greater extraction of surplus by a higher or lower presence of managers would bolster the contentions of other radical writers. Gordon contends that much of the decline in real wages by most workers, especially in the US, has been extracted and absorbed by a growing managerial class and that there are no gains to labor and sometimes not much to investors. These thoughts have also been mentioned more or less in more recent scholarly work such as Piketty (2013) among others. Since Gordon did not do any advanced statistical work in his book, and only did statistical work involving topics other than productivity and economic efficiency in the two published papers leading up to his book, this paper does an empirical analysis of how some type of BB or managerial intensity at the industry level impacts efficiency, productivity, surplus generation, managerial compensation, and organizational performance. because there were enough industries with disclosed amounts of data versus the 5 and 6 digit levels, and yet this level is at a more industry specific level than 3-digit data, and this helps one to explore more microeconomic effects of any type of intensity of supervision. The number of 4 digit industries used which had data common for all variables and common to the databases used was 259.
One limitation with the data used was that management occupation employment numbers per industry from the BLS were only available for May 2012 whereas for manufacturing all values were for 2013. There is no survey of manufacturers in years that end in 2 or 7. However, the two year of 2012 and 2013 are close enough in time that there should not be a problem in the analysis. In fact, using output values for 2013 would make managerial and employee numbers from 2012 look more productive than what would be the case otherwise if one wants to give mainstream beliefs about productivity the benefit of the doubt. Data for 2012 was found for the other major industries for which data was available such as utilities, wholesaling, retailing, finance/insurance/real estate, transportation, communications, information, professional services, educational service, health care services, management of companies and enterprises, administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, amusement, and entertainment, accommodation and food services). 5 However, the two dates can be considered close enough to estimate approximate values for Mgrs and other variables used in the analysis for each 4-digit industry.
The variable Mgrs was used along with several independent variables in double natural log 6 , least squares multiple regression to predict for each industry 1) the average value of sales and shipments per employee, 2) managers' average pay, 3) total managerial salaries for an industry as a percent of total sales, 4) rates of labor exploitation, 5) average historical net profit margin per dollar (in cents), 6) average historical return on equity (ROE) after taxes for industry firms, and 7) average historical return on assets (ROA) after taxes for industry firms. 5 Data from the Census at the 4-digit industry level were not available for mining and construction. Public administration, although important to a capitalist economy, was not considered because productivity levels are problematic to calculate and evaluate. For example, would taxes collected per government employee or government spending per government employee be considered as outputs or inputs? 6 The exceptions were the dummy variables, which were not, and could not, be transformed into natural log form. Using the double log form also allows each regression coefficient to be interpreted as an elasticity, which is often useful in economic analysis. (Roy 2013 , Roy 2014 , Roy and Wilson 2015 for the years 2009 to 2012; and the estimate of economic surplus per industry comes from taking non-management pay from total sales and dividing this by non-management pay. For this last item, and in the tradition of Baran and Sweezy (1966) and Shaikh and Tonak (1994) , mangers' pay is deemed to be a way to absorb economic surplus, and so is included in Scatterplots showed the double log models to yield the best fits between the independent variables and the dependent variables. The other independent variables used to predict these dependent variables were the 4 firm concentration ratio for each of the 4 digit industries (US Census Bureau's 2007 Economic Census) 8 ; a dummy variable indicating whether the industry is in the Marxian sense "productive" (1) or "nonproductive" (0) according to a classification scheme worked out by Shaikh and Tonak (1994) ; and the average number of employees per establishment. 9 These variables are used to assess whether market power (concentration ratio), type of industry according to use values, and firm size may have any influence on productivity levels. Traditional economic theory indicates that firms with less competition (high concentration ratios) and larger sizes enjoy market power and economies of scale in production which should result in higher levels of productivity, returns to shareholders and investors, higher pay rates for all employees, and higher profit margins. Those industries classified as "productive" should be those with the highest use values for their products (e.g., utilities, manufacturers, transportation services, educational services) as opposed to those with lesser use values such as, for example, industries in advertising, banking, most forms of retailing and, wholesaling. If Marxian theory is correct, then productive industries should have lower productivity levels and returns than non-productive ones because non-productive industries are the numerator of the surplus ratio whereas non-management pay is deemed to represent productive labor. For ROA after taxes, the Almanac gave two numbers, ROA after taxes for all firms of all sizes regardless of earning net income and another for firms reporting net income. The analysis for this paper used ROA after taxes for all firms regardless of earning net income or not when available. When this was not provided, ROA for those reporting net income was used. Unfortunately, data for all 4 digit industries were not available for all 259 industries, which limited sample size in some models. For ROA, if data was not available at the 4 digit level, ROA at the 3 digit level was used when available from the Census Bureaus' Quarterly Financial Report Data 8 Admittedly concentration ratios developed by the Census Bureau have limitations. The ratios are based only on US firms (foreign competitors are not considered) and local market concentration (at a city or metro area level) are not considered. Only national level data is considered. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is an alternative measure, but the Census only publishes this for manufacturing firms (Census Bureau 2007). Despite its limitations, the ratio is used here to indicate some type of market power that an industry has.
generators of pure economic surplus according to Baran and Sweezy (1966) and Shaikh and Tonak (1994) . Because of such large amounts of economic surplus, one would also expect rates of exploitation and managerial salaries to be higher in these industries, all else held constant. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 around here) Given the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients there does not appear to be any indications of multicollinearity among the independent variables. Table 3 shows the results of several different regression models. Since the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test found heteroscedasticity in some regression models, robust standard errors were used in these, and this is noted in the table. None of the independent variables in any of the models had a variance inflation factor above 2.0, indicating no problems of multicollinearity in any of the models.
Results

(Insert
Model 1 in Table 3 shows a statistically significant (α < 0.05) relation among all four variables and the dependent variable, a productivity measure, the natural log of sales, shipments and receipts per employee, although the explanation of variance for the model is a modest 37%.
The intensity of supervision actually has a positive association with productivity. That is, the greater the portion of managers in an industry's labor force, the greater the productivity, which does not support the bureaucratic burden concept put forth by Gordon and the other writers cited so far in this paper. A one percent increase in the percentage of managers in an industry's labor force predicts a 0.616 percent increase in output per worker on average and all else held constant. This is, however, an inelastic relationship indicating an insensitivity to increasing managerial levels. Meanwhile, nonproductive industries tend to have higher levels of output than productive ones, whereas more concentrated industries and those with larger establishments have higher productivity rates on average. The manufacturing sector performed well with regard to productivity levels yet wholesale industries and finance and insurance industries had the highest productivity levels of all thanks to high sales per employee in pharmaceutical, petroleum, farm product wholesaling and high output per employee in the securities and insurance industries.
These nonproductive industries also had high concentration ratios too. Therefore, while intensity of supervision matters with regard to productivity levels, so do industry type, market power, and average establishment size.
Model 2 shows that the level of managers is a statistically significant predictor of the log of the ratio of the total of all managerial salaries for the industry to average industry sales.
Somewhat not surprisingly, the greater the number of managers, the greater their total pay is as a Additionally, productive industries are associated with higher ROA (0.239 percent higher than non-productive industries), and a one percent increase in the number of employees per establishment is correlated with -0.175 decrease in ROA on average and all else held constant.
Concentration ratio apparently has no connection with ROA in this model.
Discussion and Conclusion
Some of the arguments for some type of "bureaucratic burden" are supported by the analysis. A greater level of managers in an industry is associated with lower ROE and ROA averages as well as high average managerial salaries and managerial salaries taking up large shares of industry sales. These results also somewhat support the contention of a managerial "class" pursuing its own agenda at the expense of owners. On the other hand, a greater level of managers is associated with higher net margins and higher productivity rates (contrary to Gordon's thoughts) which support traditional views that managers are needed to coordinate and lead output and profit maximization. Nevertheless, investors do not seem to share in any gains.
More importantly for radical scholars, a greater level of managers is connected with greater exploitation rates, and this somewhat supports the Braverman and Marglin arguments.
Additionally, instead of greater productivity rates supporting owners' objectives, it is possible that greater productivity is necessary to keep managerial compensation and not investors' returns higher. There are more 4 digit NAICS industries than the 259 analyzed in the data set used in this paper, but because of no data on many of them, only 259 could be examined. Finally, and ideally, it would be best to do some type of experiment or quasi-experiment in which the same type and same size of firms making the same type of product or offering the same type services could be staffed with the same number of production workers, staff, etc. but with one group having fewer managers than others. However, these conditions were not uncovered while doing research for this paper.
Nevertheless, this paper adds to the literature some additional evidence supporting radical views of managerial performance at the industry level. Most research and writings over the years have revolved around whether corporate Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay is fair and adequate, especially given that some estimates put CEO pay at 300 to 400 times that of the typical US workers (AFL-CIO, n.d.) Some, however, argue that US CEO pay is fair if one compares executive compensation to other professionals and not to typical workers (Sumo 2013) whereas others see no connection between CEO pay and corporate performance (Collins 2001 
